











The Love of the One for the Many and the Many for the One 
David SWARTZ 




The philosophical “problem” of the one and the many that has occupied philosophers since Parmenides is 
also about love and the metaphysical foundations of authorship. In the Parmenides Plato takes up this 
discussion of the one and the many, leading to the most paradoxical conclusions, such as that the one is 
always becoming older and younger than itself at the same time. To defend Parmenides, Plato has Zeno of 
Elea propose the thesis that the one can be divided ad infinitum. Therefore, the one cannot be divided at 
all. For the poet, the paradox of the one and the many is conquered through the concept of being nothing. 
The authorial nothingness that the author is interested in willfully achieving involves the simultaneous unity 
and fragmentation of the author's authorial voice. The author seeks to represent multiplicity and unity 
simultaneously; which is to say, the author seeks a vision of the one through the many and the many 
through the one. The simultaneous love of the one for the many and the many for the one describes the 
self-reflective artistic act. 
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One who sees the unity of things is dialectical. 
Plato, the Republic (VII 537c) 
Every good has the power of uniting its participants, 
and every union is good; and The Good is the same as 
The One. 
Proclus, Metaphysical Elements (Proposition XIII) 
In what follows, I will look at the philosophical 
problem of the one and the many from the point of 
view of the artist or author. 
The problem of the one and the many that has 
occupied philosophers since Parmenides is of 
central concern to our discussion because it sets 
the one and the many (and hence being and 
becoming) in opposition to each other, only to 
claim that such oppositions cannot logically co-
exist. In fact, according to Parmenides and to the 
Neoplatonic philosophers who spoke about his 
doctrine of the indivisible One or The Good, 
existence itself could not be attributed to the One. 
Discussions of this nature isolate oneness from 
multiplicity, being, and even unity since nothing at 
all can be attributed to a completely self-sufficient 
whole, not even self-reflection. I should rephrase 
the words “nothing at all” to “nothing above all”, 
since it would be for the concept of nothing that 
oneness would have a way of becoming many, that 
is, by willing its own absence. 
When I began this study several years ago, such a 
concept of oneness appeared incomprehensible to 
me, and I chose to discuss oneness in a way that 
was reconcilable with unity, being, and multiplicity. 
However, I have subsequently grown unsure about 
whether we can entirely discount Parmenides´ idea 
of oneness and some of its corresponding 
paradoxes, especially in light of Shakespeare´s 
invoking of the “tenth Muse” in his Sonnets, which 
assigns the central task of authorship to the role of 
being or willing nothing. 
When Plato takes up the discussion of the one and 
the many in the Parmenides it leads to paradoxical 
conclusions (if any kind of change to its nature is 
permitted), such as that the one is always becoming 
older and younger than itself at the same time. To 
defend Parmenides, Plato has Zeno of Elea propose 
the thesis that if the one were dividable, its 
divisions or multiples could carry on ad infinitum. 
Therefore, the one cannot be divided at all. “If all 
things are one”, says Parmenides, “that one of 
which existence is posited would be without parts, 
limitless, and therefore would be nothing.” 
According to Parmenides´ first hypothesis, not only 
is oneness not reconcilable with multiplicity or 
being, but it is also nameless, unsayable and 
unknowable. Nevertheless, the interlocutors in 
Plato´s dialogue eventually find a way of talking 
about oneness as reconcilable with multiplicity. 
Later philosophers such as Plotinus (1956), Proclus, 
and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite would 
expand this initial idea of the indivisible one, 
making it central to their understanding of divinity 
and the problem of how the many emanated from 
the one. 
From the artist’s or author’s point of view 
(assuming that the artist can be talked about as 
being one person), where does the desire to 
multiply come from? Also, at what stage does the 
one decide that it must multiply to exist? Or that it 
requires multiplication for self-fulfilment? In what 
way is “to become many” to love many, especially 
if the many are parts emanating out of oneself? Is 
artistic creation a form of self-love or self-












though the love of the other were another way of 
looking at the love of oneself. An entirely self-
contained one, on the other hand, would have no 
reason to multiply. 
According to Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, 
“the procession of things from, and their reversion 
to, the One … can be understood as intertwined, 
simultaneous, and co-eternal ‘moments’ of the 
same cosmic reality, whereby a given thing 
oscillates, or spirals, between unity and 
multiplicity.” (Carrasquillo, 2013, p. 207, 211) 
Dionysius maintains that it is the divine eros which 
causes the One to emanate outside of itself “the 
divine eros is ecstatic; it does not permit any to be 
lovers of themselves but of those which they love.” 
Through this eros, the One comes out from “within” 
itself, ecstatically shooting forth outside of itself, 
differentiating itself into many, thus giving being to 
the world: (Carrasquillo, 2013, p. 214) 
Pseudo-Dionysius’ triadic structure of causation, 
consisting of 
abiding, procession, and reversion (monê, prodos, 
epistrophê) […] shows how the Good abides in itself, 
proceeds out of itself into creation, and reverts back 
into itself [w]ithin the context of the reversion of all 
things to the One. (Carrasquillo, 2013, p. 211) 
In Plato's Symposium, the prophetess Diotima of 
Mantinea describes the motives behind the desire 
of the one to become many as the innate human 
impulse to achieve immortality: 
The mortal nature is seeking as far as is possible to be 
everlasting and immortal: and this is only to be 
attained by generation, because generation always 
leaves behind a new existence in the place of the old. 
Nay even in the life of the same individual there is 
succession and not absolute unity: a man is called the 
same, and yet in the short interval which elapses 
between youth and age, and in which every animal is 
said to have life and identity, he is undergoing a 
perpetual process of loss and reparation... Marvel not 
then at the love which all men have of their offspring; 
for that universal love and interest is for the sake of 
immortality. (Plato, 2008, 207-208)  
Above all, the one wants to divide itself up, to 
procreate, to tell its story, to maintain its memory 
beyond time and space: in short, to become 
immortal. In exchange for losing its initial Absolute 
oneness, the one is banking on the immortality of 
its parts. To embrace authorial nothingness, the 
author moves beyond being and becoming or the 
one and the many (in the usual sense), by 
presenting both at the same time. To achieve his 
goal, the artist becomes invisible. According to the 
French novelist Gustave Flaubert,  
The artist must be in his work as God is in creation, 
invisible and all-powerful; one must sense him 
everywhere but never see him. (Flaubert, 1980, p. 
230).  
Neither may we forget that the representation of 
the artist's invisible voice originates by way of the 
artist´s invisible hands. In effect, the author writes 
his character´s voices into existence. Meanwhile, 
the invisible hands of the artist remain removed 
from his artwork. 
 
Fig. 1 Vincent van Gogh, The Potato Eaters 1885, oil 
on canvas, 82 cm x 114 cm, Van Gogh Museum, 
Amsterdam (Vincent van Gogh Foundation).   
In Vincent Van Gogh's The Potato Eaters (1885), the 
artist presents us with five characters, one with her 
back to the viewer. All five characters, except the 
younger one with her back to us, can be seen eating 
and drinking with their right hand. The subject of 
the painting is the artist's invisible hands expressed 
through the visible hands of the peasants eating 
around the table, and the invisible hands of the 
artist himself, symbolically represented by the 
person at the table whose hands we cannot see. 
They are five around the table to emphasise that 
they are part of one hand together: the artist´s 
hand. 
A similar analogy can be found in Pier Paolo 
Pasolini's film Teorema (1968) where a mysterious 
unnamed visitor to an affluent Italian household 
can be viewed as a symbolic representation of the 
artist in relation to his characters. His visit to their 
home in Milan brings the entire household to life. 
Moreover, his erotic encounters with each of them 
inspire the opening of each of their hands to the 
mysterious powers of self-discovery, including both 
creative and self-destructive powers. The visitor 
brings these powers to the characters as an author 
brings his characters to life. When he leaves their 
home and disappears from their lives, their hands, 
which had formally been activated with a creative 
spirit, turn in upon themselves. The characters 
cannot exist without their author. Pasolini connects 
the hand to eros by revealing the connection 
between (physical) love and the hand; the opening 
of the hand symbolising the liberation of 
subjectivity through self-reflective love. Pasolini's 
film can be viewed as an attempt to isolate the 
hand's capacity for the expansion and retraction of 
subjectivity within the sphere of eros. 
Just as his love and presence brought them to life, 
when the visitor leaves, the characters lose their 












youngest daughter Odette clenching her fists in 
despair until her spiritless body is taken away to a 
mental hospital; the father undressing himself 
naked in a crowded train station; the maid burying 
herself alive; the mother engaging in indiscriminate 
sex with strangers who resemble the guest; and the 
son psychotically painting his desire for the absent 
guest. The characters in Pasolini's film exist only in 
connection to the visitor, which is to say, to their 
author. The author, being his characters´ creator, 
exemplifies the idea that the one loves the many 
(evidenced by the visitor making love to each of his 
characters). Meanwhile, the love of the many for 
the one is illustrated by the characters´ need for the 
visitor’s presence in their otherwise empty (non-
existent) lives. 
In Fernando Pessoa´s poetry, the flight from the one 
subject or author into the form of his many names 
or heteronyms is psychologically inspired by a 
philosophy more akin to Heraclitus than 
Parmenides, who said that reality is both one and 
many. In his notebooks, Pessoa wrote:  
All things changing, says Heraclitus, no knowledge is 
possible. My answer is that all things changing, myself 
change with them, and so am in relative stability. 
Subject and object changing perpetually are the 
stable ones in relation to the other. (Pessoa, 1968, p. 
113) 
Pessoa is concerned not only with a view of human 
agency as changeable but with the expansion of 
subjectivity itself to include multiplicity. In this 
manner, Pessoa reflects not only the Greek 
philosophers but also the American poet Walt 
Whitman, who in Leaves of Grass writes: 
Very well then. I contradict myself 
(I am large, I contain multitudes). (1958, p. 96) 
In one of his poems, Pessoa writes: 
Não sei quantas almas tenho. 
Cada momento mudei. 
Continuamente me estranho. 
Nunca me vi nem achei. 
De tanto ser, só tenho alma. 
Quem tem alma não tem calma. 
Quem vê é só o que vê, 
Quem sente não é quem é, 
Atento ao que eu sou e vejo, 
Torno-me eles e não eu. (Pessoa, 2008, p. 268) 
 
[I don´t know how many souls I have. 
I changed at every moment.  
I always feel self-estranged. 
I´ve never seen or found myself 
From being so much, I have only soul. 
A man who has soul has no calm. 
A man who sees is just what he sees 
A man who feels is not who he is.  
Attentive to what I am and see,  
I become them and stop being I. 
On another occasion, Pessoa writes: 
Assim eu me acomodo 
Com o que Deus criou,  
Deus tem diverso modo  
Diversos modos sou.  
Assim a Deus imito,  
Que quando fez o que é  
Tirou-lhe o infinito  
E a unidade até. (2008, p. 273) 
 
[I´ve learned to adopt my self 
To the world God has made. 
His mode of being is different: 
My being has different modes. 
Thus I imitate God, 
Who when he made what is 
Took from it the infinite  
And even its unity.] 
With Pessoa, we witness the metaphysical 
transformation of the one into the many. Pessoa's 
projected multiplicities involve the realisation that 
both pure infinity and pure unity were taken from 
the world in order to allow it to exist. 
In Richard II, Shakespeare uses the concept of 
nothing to unassert his own authorial identity. Only 
by becoming nothing is he able to become many. At 
the end of a long soliloquy, the imprisoned King 
states: 
Thus play I in one person many people,  
And none contented: sometimes am I king; 
Then treasons make me wish myself a beggar,  
And so I am: then crushing penury 
Persuades me I was better when a king;  
Then am I king'd again: and by and by  
Think that I am unking'd by Bolingbroke,  
And straight am nothing: but whate'er I be,  
Nor I nor any man that but man is  
With nothing shall be pleased, till he be eased  
With being nothing. (Shakespeare, 1988, Richard II, V, 
5, vv. 31-40, p. 393) 
This passage reveals the playwright´s art of playing 
many different parts, and the psychology 
underlying the author´s authorial identity. 
Shakespeare, in effect, is showing us how he wills 
his own nothing. 
By representing the state of mind before the 
creation of multiplicities, nothing originates the act 
of parting. 
In Sonnet 8, Shakespeare writes: 












Mark how one string, sweet husband to another, 
Strikes each in each by mutual ordering, 
Resembling sire, and child, and happy mother, 
Who all in one, one pleasing note do sing: 
Whose speechless song being many, seeming one, 
Sings this to thee: ‘Thou single wilt prove none.’ 
(1988, Sonnet 8, vv. 8-14, p. 752) 
The final couplet says the opposite of what it means 
explicitly. “Thou single” refers to one and will 
(“single wilt”) while “prove none” refers to the 
concept of nothing. In other words, “who all in one 
[…] being many, seeming one” refers to 
Shakespeare´ one (1) and none (0) together giving 
birth to the many. Shakespeare’s “tenth Muse” is 
his way of becoming nothing. In sonnet 38, 
Shakespeare writes: 
Be thou the tenth Muse, ten times more in worth 
Than those old nine which rhymers invocate; 
And he that calls on thee, let him bring forth 
Eternal numbers to outlive long date. (1988, vv. 9-12, 
p. 755) 
In Sonnet 10, Shakespeare writes: 
Grant, if thou wilt, thou art beloved of many, 
But that thou none lov'st is most evident: (1988, vv. 3-
4, p. 752) 
Shakespeare makes it possible for the reader to 
read his sonnets vicariously on many levels; most 
obviously because his name is Will. He is proposing 
that you too will become will. “If thou wilt” (that is, 
if you too would be will), “thou (too would be) 
beloved of many”. In fact, you too will be beloved 
but love none. This goes back to the idea of willing 
nothing as a way of begetting the many. 
One might read Shakespeare´s procreation 
sequence of sonnets as a concentrated attempt to 
reveal the nature of the dramatist's task, and what 
fuels the poet’s calling and inspiration to write his 
plays. Above all, it has to do with overcoming Time, 
the principal enemy of the poet in the Sonnets. 
The tenth muse is Shakespeare’s aesthetics’ of 
parting. In effect, through the author´s will to 
nothing or “tenth Muse” (equating 1 with will, and 
0 with nothing), the number one or will is 
juxtaposed with zero (or nothing) to create a kind 
of aesthetic eroticism symbolised by the number 
10. 
The one (and by one I mean the authorial unity or 
authorship) loves or wills nothing the same way the 
one loves multiplicity. It may be helpful to look at 
Keats´ definition of the poetical character to see 
how nothing relates to multiplicity from the point 
of view of the author. “The poetical character”, 
according to Keats: 
Is not itself – it has no self – it is everything and 
nothing – it has no character – it enjoys light and 
shade; it lives in gusto, be it foul or fair, high or low, 
rich or poor, mean or elevated – it has as much delight 
in an Iago as an Imogen (Cymbeline). What shocks the 
virtuous philosopher delights the Chameleon Poet 
[…]. [A poet] has no identity – he is continually in for - 
and filling some other Body.  
Men of genius are as great as certain ethereal 
chemicals operating on the Mass of neutral intellect – 
but they have not any individuality, any determined 
Character. (2009, p. 52, p. 194) 
While Keats´s notion of the poetical character 
(often referred to as “negative capability”) reminds 
us of the authorial nothingness at the heart of 
authorship, out of which the many parts created 
are merely parts played, I want to suggest 
something a bit more ordinary: that the multiplicity 
of parts is anchored in the character of the reader 
whose role is nothing less than to perform the 
resurrection of the writer. The reader’s part is the 
immortalising part. 
Like the universe at large, the text or artwork must 
be expandable through the future reader to survive 
time. The relationship between the poet and the 
reader is such that the poet allows his poetry to be 
shared by the reader as a kind of surrogate self, 
wherein both the reader and author are given new 
life. The reader is given new life in another way too, 
in taking on the role of the redeemer of the poet´s 
verse, fulfilling the prophecy of being the poet´s 
“better part”. Meanwhile, the poet is given new life 
by having his poems or plays brought back to life by 
the reader. 
In the “Phoenix and the Turtle” (Shakespeare, 1988, 
p. 782), two lovers celebrate a ritual transformation 
into one. Could it be that the birds symbolise the 
author´s and reader´s joint enterprise to overcome 
time through the perpetual immolation of their 
loving embrace? When the author and reader 
became one, the text survives forever. 
Shakespeare’s nothing is precisely that which 
makes room for multiplicity and presence. It is 
similar to the Pythagorean need for a void to 
reproduce number. It is a nothing which allows for 
the motion of will. 
The one, desiring to become many, resigns itself to 
being nothing. 
Nothing (sees itself) as expanding through its love 
of will. By perpetually becoming many, nothing 
remains without statehood or personal identity. 
The identity-less hero is both author and reader and 
neither. 
The authorial nothingness expanding in every 
direction beyond distinction refuses to be itself. 
Nothing will have no foundation in space or time, 
and consequently, will “bring forth/Eternal 
numbers to outlive long date.” (Shakespeare, 1988, 
Sonnet 38, vv. 11-12, p. 755). 
In Shakespeare's early sonnets, self-love is 
regarded as selfish and narcissistic folly. The writer 
urges the reader to share himself. The best and 












the charge of narcissism is the willful fragmentation 
of the self: “To live a second life on second head” 
(1988, Sonnet 68, v. 7, p. 759), by recreating oneself 
through bearing children, writing poetry or making 
art. 
It is with his “tenth Muse” that Shakespeare tells us 
he shall outlive time. The tenth muse also refers to 
the poet´s hands. In his Sonnets, the word “hand” 
often alludes to the hand of Time, for example, in 
the verses:  
Then let not winter's ragged hand deface,  
In thee thy summer, ere thou be distilled. (1988, 
Sonnet 6, vv. 1-2, p. 751) 
or 
Against my love shall be as I am now, 
With time's injurious hand crushed and o'erworn; 
(1988, Sonnet 63, vv. 1-2, p. 758).  
Though the word “hand” often appears in this 
capacity, it also implies the opposite of what 
Shakespeare means by Time. For example, 
Shakespeare writes: “Or what strong hand can hold 
his swift foot back?” (Sonnet 63, v. 11, p. 759), 
speculating as to the existence or absence of a hand 
powerful enough to hold Time back. Alternatively, 
Nay, if you read this line, remember not 
The hand that writ it; (Sonnet 71, vv. 5-6, p. 759) 
to remind us of the invisible absent hand of the 
poet. 
While oneness is above and beyond number, 
plurality begins with one and nothing.  Willing 
nothingness into multiplicity with his hands´ self-
reflective initiative, the poet reveals the process of 
artistic creation leading to immortality. 
The human psychology behind multiplication is the 
desire to create a lasting legacy in one´s image. One 
might also create a legacy in one´s non-image. To 
make oneself into multiples, to divide oneself up 
requires the will to become nothing. 
The first stage is to find a way to multiply oneself, 
to divide oneself up into parts; for example, to 
create sons or sonnets or characters. In Sonnet 3, 
Shakespeare writes: “Now is the time that face 
should form another,” (v. 2, p. 751). The poet's goal 
is not only to express the self's multitudinous, 
contradictory nature but to create an inner space 
wherein such multitudinous divisions can be 
willfully developed and projected. Indeed, love 
itself requires division! 
Let me confess that we two must be twain,  
Although our undivided loves are one; (Sonnet 36, vv. 
1-2, p. 755) 
When one draws near to oneself, one becomes 
multiple. These different multiples or parts — 
having their source of life in the poet, speak to the 
poet's imaginative leap into multiplicity. 
One increases and decreases at the same time. One 
grows older and younger at the same time. One 
disappears, and at the same time, one appears. One 
forgets at the same time as one remembers. One 
moves forwards, and at the same time, one moves 
backwards. 
Art is the self-reflective act of this simultaneous 
love. It is the love or will to nothing. 
The great circle of causation is how all things 
emanate from the non-existent artist. 
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